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Resumo
 O estudo ora apresentado tem como objetivo mostrar como uma atitude cética 
e agônica são imperativos no pensamento político em direção à democracia. Partindo 
do paradigma de mundos políticos possíveis, a maioria das teorias acerca da democracia 
revelam-se como algumas dentre as muitas possíveis para configurar e  reconfigurar  o 
mundo ordinário. Ademais, o conceito de “epoché” herdado pelo ceticismo direciona a um 
incessante debate entre teorias e Weltanschauungen. Desta forma, o pensamento agônico 
direciona a um impossível julgamento em termos de “verdadeiro/falso”, em resumo a 
ausência de um verdadeiro conhecimento político. O trabalho discute como o pensamento 
político, especificamente no referente às “teorias da democracia”, precisam ser vistos sob 
uma inconstante realidade axiológica, a qual reforça o caráter fideístico de qualquer decisão 
política, isto é, apenas uma aposta em determinado poder soberano certo de seu potencial 
para prover a transição do caos à ordem com a consequente normatividade. 
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Abstract
 The study hereby proposed aims to show how a skeptical and agonal attitude is an 
imperative demand on political thinking towards democracy. Departing from the paradigm 
of several possible political worlds, most theories on democracy reveal themselves as just 
one of multiple possibilities to configure and reconfigure the ordinary world. Therefore, 
the skeptic’s legacy on the concept of ‘epoché’ accrues an unceasing benevolent debate 
between theories and Weltanschauungen. This way, some agonal way of thinking causes 
the inexorability of any judgment in terms of “true/false”, summarizing the absence of a 
truly political knowledge. The paper discusses how political thought, especially concerning
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‘Democracy theories’, must be understood under an unstable axiological reality, which 
reinforces the fideist approach of any political decision, that is, merely a bet from a 
circumscribed sovereign power confident on its own potential to provide transition from 
chaos to order with the consequent normativity.
Keywords: Democracy; skepticism; epistemology.
Introduction
The present work begins with an exaltation of the political philosophy, in 
other words, it aims a certain contribution to show that the so precious separation 
between such reflexive ethos and another from a more empiricist nature is 
something pernicious, in contrariety of what can be noticed at the general political 
science. Such distinction is “obscure, obscurantist and makes no justice to those 
two working areas, which are essential to the constitution of the subject. One gives 
sense to the other. One cannot exist without the other.”4 (LESSA, 2003, p.81)
Moreover, it highlights how much relevant it is to revisit the so-called “classics” 
of the political thought, more specifically in favor of the present work, the legacy of 
the skeptical school, a doctrine that teaches us not to fall under imposed dogmas, 
in other words, not to adhere to a system of not evident propositions. Therefore, 
we admit the relevance of objections in order to result in such posture, when 
assumed in its fullness, in a stagnation; which we eliminate with the adherence of 
the “possible” that is exposed by the Kantian thinking.
Hereupon we will endeavor to reflect over a Schimittian criticism to contingent 
and pragmatic principled junction between Liberalism and democracy. This 
junction, to the referred author, is faded to fail since its beginning, such as in the 
Marxist criticism to the capitalism:
The matter consists in knowing whether we may get a specific political 
idea from the pure and consequent concept of individualistic liberalism. 
To this, we must answer with the negative. For the negation of the political 
that is contained in any consequent individualism certainly leads to a 
political praxis of distrust against all political powers and state formats we 
can imagine, however it never leads to an own and positive political and 
state theory (SCHMITT, 1992, p.97)
We stress that such criticism does not target the democracy itself in a 
destructive sense that is always a goal in the thoughts of the referred author, due 
to his modus operandi of taking properly seriously his adversaries. Therefore, it 
shall be a positive contribution in order to elevate the reflection about democracy 
for itself for beyond the not politicized zone promoted by the Liberalism. 
Nevertheless, we must not ignore the contribution of such movement in what 
concerns to the individual freedom, what in fact will not be observed in here.
4 Any reference presented in this work is a proximate translation.
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Thus, the adoption of the Schimittian criticism consists the touchstone 
for a correction of the perpetrated apolitical character, and notwithstanding the 
potentiation of the democrat thinking and spirit. Therefore, we will adopt the 
referred criticism not in a dogmatic sense, which should be followed indiscriminately, 
but as the conducting wire which we intend to overcome, maybe not in a peremptory 
way, but that comes to indicate a path to be followed, revealing one more step for 
the constant “ought to be” that consists the way of the political philosophy and 
despite the political science on a broad sense.
Agonistic Foundation
We begin the present section with the evocation of the paradigm of the 
possible worlds (LESSA, 2003, pp.103,104), that is all the associative infinity 
which the objective world can be coated with, and is effectively coated with 
the reservation of its proper apprehension in space-time, taking as a starting 
point the multiplicity of human lucubration. About this matter, Hanna Arendt 
brilliantly expresses her understanding about the human “creationist” character. 
In other words, the liberty with which the human being (in its plurality), 
instead of the humanity that is the major expression of the above referred 
attribute suppression, in the means that there is an imperative designation given 
by history, is coated when inserted in the political field to make something new, 
in the author’s words:
“It becomes hard to comprehend that we should be in fact free in a field, 
that is, not even moved by ourselves nor dependent on the given material. 
There is freedom only in the particular scope of the internal concept of the 
politics. We save from this freedom right in the need of the history. An 
abominable absurd.” (ARENDT, 1998, p.24)
Regarding her concern to this reducibility of the human capacity, Arendt 
alerts for the matter of judging in the modernity, which is presented in two aspects: 
one in subordinating the individual to the general, in other words, to submit to 
current criteria; and the other when we face up with things for which there is 
no known parameters. This last aspect is under the Nihilism denomination or 
synonyms such as:
“(…) human judgments can only be demanded where they have parameters, 
that the capacity of discernment is nothing more than the capacity to 
aggregate in a correct and adequate way, the isolated to the general in 
which it corresponds and came to terms. It is known that the capacity 
of discernment insists and must insist in judge in a direct way and without 
parameters.” (ARENDT, 1998, p.33)
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Though, we must object, when due opportunity, the epistemic disagreement 
by which the proposal of (re)composition of the objective reality will pass, not as a 
reducibility, that is, diminishing it, but as a suitability to the real character of the 
human understanding, limiting it, establishing at what extent it may reach. In the 
following section it will be imminent a touch with the theoretical constructs of 
Carl Schmitt about “sovereignty”, “decision”, and “politics”.
In his exposition about the concept of the political, there is an explanation 
about the categories of specifically political understanding, that is, those in which 
the political thinking must be supported in order to act with property. So, the 
criteria that gives the condition of political itself is the distinction between “friend-
enemy”, that is: “The difference between friend and enemy has the meaning to 
designate the degree of extreme intensity of a connection or separation, of an 
association or disassociation.” (SCHMITT, 1992: p.52). Accordingly, the one 
that may represent an existential danger to a certain political organized group 
would be called “enemy” and should be fought, being the “war” another category 
of the political horizon, taking it seriously as the author likes to treat his “enemies” 
in his works, and it can even reach the level of an extermination war.
This is the crucial point in the theory of Schmitt and Arendt, once the least 
author abhors such result due to her plural world representation. Yet she sees the 
“destroying” as dissociable from the “building” inherits of the human strength 
and capacity; likewise, Schmitt also recognizes the extremity of this extent in the 
political field, once for the configuration of this ambit as not meddling in the 
others of the human thinking and action, it is necessary the existence of an enemy, 
but accepts it as possible in an ultimate degree.
Similarly, when discoursing about the historical conceptions over 
sovereignty, running through Hobbes and Bodin, Schmitt correlates the two 
political categories of “sovereignty” and “decision” from the observing of exception 
state, as the juridical figures use to set. It becomes the most interesting concept 
for the fact that “the normal proves nothing, exception proves it all”; it not only 
confirms the rule, but the rule itself only lives because of exception” (SCHMITT, 
1996, p.94), once this situation reveals what is beyond the instituted, not covered 
by regulations or juridical figures, despite its necessary juridical prevision which 
cannot act in an analytic way for not having enough elements of what is to come, 
and therefore reveal the need for an authority capable of deciding about the 
moment of deflagration and, consequently, solve it in view of the impossibility of 
an endogenous response given by a positively valued systematic-rationalist order, 
which notwithstanding its mere prevision could not provide it specific details and 
purposeful actions.
The fact of a regulation, order, or a point of accountability “implants itself ” 
seems to be an easily imaginable supposition, for this kind of juridical 
rationalism. However, as the unity and the systematic order could suspend 
itself in a concrete case it is something hard to conceive, and keeps being a 
juridical problem while the state of exception is distinct from the juridical 
chaos of any kind (SCHMITT, 1992, p. 93)
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Indeed, resides in the ruler’s power, which would be unlimited in this view, 
make the transition from the emergency state to the normality, in a concrete 
situation and in an existential sense. It would reverberate in a new normative 
possibility once there is no “regulation applicable in chaos. The order must be 
implanted so that the juridical order makes sense. A normal situation must 
be created, and ruler is the one who decides, definitely, if such state is really 
predominant” (SCHMITT, 1992: p.93)
At this point, some elucidation is necessary. In the Schmittian concept, 
democracy should have as a principle regulating the identity one, that is, identity 
between rulers and ruled ones. A homogeneous space of normative application 
would be necessary (SCHMITT,1992, p.92). Considering this, his conclusion 
about the regular principle of democracy, Schmitt comes to consider as possible 
democracy in an authoritarian regime: “Bolshevism and the fascism are certainly 
anti liberal, as all dictatorship, but not necessarily anti democrat” (SCHMITT apud 
MOUFFE,1992, p. 2).
Such position derives from his strong criticism against the liberalism, 
about what is going to be talked later. That said we combat that such theoretical 
position may have any positive use. That is, it cannot be understood in a way that 
legitimates authoritarian regimes, as some intend, but in a way to provide the 
proper identity required above. The path to reach such thing is a hard task for 
those who look into the practical field and, as initially affirmed, reflexive of the 
political science.
Therefore, we make clear there is no bad intention in the use of this 
finding, which is the need for the effectiveness of the identity principle, but 
indeed represents the disclosure of a contradiction found by the author, once the 
individualism required by one inhibits the implement of the other.
Therefore, we conclude that the implement of such principle of identity does 
not necessarily come through authoritarian ways. We can present as example the 
Rousseaunian construct of “general will” as an adverse possibility to the referred 
authoritarianism – disregarding, as an exemplary order, the considerations about 
the implementation premises (axiological, e.g.) of this state (situation) – as a mean 
of implementing what is proposed. Thus, we conclude that every proposition in 
this sense represents a possibility, and not a necessity.
With everything that was exposed so far, we come to the following position: 
the disclosure that the human being, as it always brings the capacity to create 
something new over what has been instituted, residing here a supposed Schmittian/
Arendtian paradigm – not dogmatic, some questions are revealed simultaneously: 
the implementation of the new comes from a deliberative and consensual plurality, 
as nostalgically Arendt aspired when discoursing about the greek polis, or there 
would be the possibility of establishing the homogeneous ground of normative 
implementation, where popular sovereignty would be effectively represented, as 
Schimitt presented to us (always avoiding bad intentioned interpretations, we 
asserted that the possibility of a democracy instituted by an authoritarianism shall 
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not be cogitated, so that there are propositions in this direction by contemporary 
proponents of “radical democracy”, which resides in the extreme opposite of this 
supposition)?
Gnoseological Abysses
This part of the work is going to be an expatiation about how much relevant 
becomes the skeptical teaching, once through such line of thinking we understand 
that for each theoretical formulation will be always and necessarily possible an 
imaginative contraposition. It justifies the revisiting of so important concepts of 
a determined school – to the extent that represents “a certain argumentative line 
showing how it is possible to live correctly (correctly being understood referring not only 
to the virtue, but in a wider meaning (…)” (EMPÍRICO, 1997, pp,118, 119) – 
such as “Diaphony”, “Epoche” and “Ataraxy”.
Skepticism arose in classical Antiquity as a reaction to the proliferation of 
philosophical systems all of them oriented to detect the truth. In more precise 
terms, the skeptical attitude emerges from the discovery that philosophy is a 
playing field between systems that support that there is a deep distinction between 
what is and what appears to be. (LESSA, 2008, p. 5)
However, the skeptical position alone, devoid of logical-metaphysical 
reflection and broad theoretical framework, does not makes distinction on 
“analytic truths” (a priori) and “synthetic truths” (a posteriori), thus, it doesn’t 
reach facts in its contingent or general significance nor foresees any particular 
meaning contingently understood as fact (QUINE, 1951, pp.20-21). Therefore, 
a purely empirical approach tends to be reductionist about human phenomena, 
because each significant fact receives its own meaning from any logical construct 
concerning its own as immediate experience (QUINE, 1951, pp.34-35). In 
this sense, the skeptical position will be relativized as groundwork from the 
very important Kantian criticism, by which such positioning, when taken to 
the extreme, would result in stagnation, as evidenced by one of his canons of 
principles (ataraxy).
Such investigation reveals itself of in the same importance, once we 
limit the human knowledge, in contrariety to rationalist postulations that 
tends to comprehend all, a criticism degree will be posteriorly raised about 
the Diaphonical “visions of the world” related to the theory of democracy and, 
notwithstanding, it will highlight how a political decision have a character of 
fideism once there is no applicability of patterns such as “good-bad”, “beauty- ugly”, 
and “useful-harmful”; it is because of the fact that the character of fideism results 
from the strength that the decision politically considered possesses to aggregate or 
disassociate politically existent invidious. When reading the Pyrrho’s hypothesis, 
a kind of “skeptical manifest”, we face with the issue raised by this current of 
thinking about the reflection over “good or bad”. Such considerations always 
result in a concern, that is, we will search for the state characterized as the 
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good one in contrariety to the bad one; arising from that the reflexive need. 
Yet in his line of thinking, all theoretical system that brings the explanation of 
a certain phenomenon (a term borrowed from the Kantian doctrine) will be 
open to a contraposition (diaphonia), which consequently would take skeptical 
to suspend any kind of judgment (epoche) and would result to the so acclaimed 
tranquility (ataraxy), that is, once the skeptical on its reflexions “finds himself 
before the equipollence in controversies, and cannot decide about it, adopted 
the suspension” ; such posture highlights an exacerbation about the sensible 
impressions, which are determined as criteria of legitimacy for the action, once 
they are not liable to questioning.
(…) We have action criteria, according to those in our daily lives we practice 
certain acts and avoid others, and we treat here about such criteria. We 
say than that for the skeptic the criteria is the appearance, which means 
the sensible impressions, once they consist in involuntary affections and 
sensations, therefore they are not liable to questioning. So, presumably, 
no one will discuss if something that exists has this or that appearance, 
the discussion is if that, in fact, corresponds to what it looks like.” 
(EMPÍRICO, 1997, pp.116, 121)
At this point, after a brief explanation, far from any arrogant impulse, in 
order to highlight the genius point of this reflection, and, nevertheless, offer 
you some retouch, we disagree of such last ending of the skeptical positioning, 
which is tranquility, and its ethos guided by the sensible impressions; even 
because of the the fact that those offer essential elements for human reflection, as 
forward we will try to show, but not exhausting all possible knowledge. Aiming 
to offer a certain precision to the exposed about the skeptical legacy, we open 
space for the name who was responsible for one of the greatest turns in human 
thinking: Immanuel Kant and his critique of pure reason. Indeed we state here 
that the human knowledge does not have as a goal the objects themselves, what 
is nominated by the author as transcendental, and, as we formulate a system of 
such concepts we would a priori institute a transcendental philosophy: “I call 
transcendental all knowledge that in general occupies itself not so much with objects, 
but with our way of knowing objects, once it must be possible a priori” (KANT, 
1980, p.33)
That is, the Kantian revolution admits the nature of things, objects taken on 
themselves, as something inexhaustible, and due to that, he establishes as object of 
his reason criticism the constitution of a canon of knowledge a priori, contained 
inside the own human reason, through which it becomes possible the judging 
of the nature of things, taken as phenomena.What “a skeptical school” would 
define as “principle of action”, that is, those elements arising from the sensible 
impressions, Kant would define as formats of intuition, that is:
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“Since the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily 
proceeds every intuition of those objects, we understand how the form of all 
phenomena can be processed in the minds before all actualized perceptions, 
consequently a priori, and with it, while a pure intuition in which every 
object must be determined, can contain, before every experience, principles 
of their relations” (KANT, 1980, p.42)
Therefore, because of the categories of representation (space/time) of our 
sensibility, we can represent the object, not as it is itself, but as a subjective 
reality, respecting its subjective conditions of the sensible intuition, objectively 
represented, “cannot be included even subsisting nor inhering the objects themselves” 
(KANT, 1980, p.47)
Furthermore, it is not only in the mere intuition where the human 
understanding resides, or it would configure a fumble in the dark; case in which 
we diagnose the skeptical reflection in service of the sensible impressions in search 
of tranquility. That said, the human comprehension does not exhaust by the 
process of representation given by intuition. There is still the synthetic process a 
priori where the unity from the multiple given by intuition, by means of concept, 
is formed. The great relevance of this process subjective character resides here, in 
the means that the pure apperception is needed “for being that self-conscience 
that when produces the representation I think which must follow all the others 
and it is one and identical in all conscience, cannot be followed by any other.” 
(KANT, 1980, p. 85)
Indeed, if the self-consciousness was not part of all multiple representations, 
given by intuition, they could not be denominated as being part of the 
cognoscente subject, being than subordinated to the condition of the self-
consciousness synthesis. This process of formation of the conscience unity is, 
thus, the foundation for the knowledge of an object given as phenomena, and 
consequently, of all possible experience.
“The synthetic unity of consciousness is an objective condition of all 
knowledge, which I need for myself not only to know an object, but in 
which all intuition has to be in order to become object to me, otherwise, in 
another way and without this synthesis of the multiple it would not join in a 
conscience.” (KANT, 1980, p. 87)
Thus, the statement exposed by the Hanna Arendt about “judging in a 
direct way with no parameters” can be understood from the Kantian perspective 
as a reformulation of what it becomes acceptance in a space-time limit, once it is 
impossible to reach an ultimate truth from which all essence of the object politically 
discussed would be extracted. And the great importance of the skeptical teaching 
resides here, even not having followed the correct way (here considered as so) in 
the consideration over epistemology, already recognized the diaphonic character of 
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the theoretical postulations, and its suspension of judgment (epoche), it must not be 
understood in a lethargic, inaction, intuitive sense.
It is revealed as something of great importance the Schmittian’s notes about 
the fideistic and aggregation character of the political in relation to the decision-
making, and it is because of the inappropriate designation in such ambit for a 
decision such as “right or wrong”, “useful or harmful”.
Therefore, when we are capable of aggregating a certain group of people 
able to “fight” (here we use the proper Schmittian vocabulary, despite 
its possible institutional significance, therefore, for beyond the jus belli) for 
the ideal shared, in consonance with the principle of identity between 
“governors” and “governed ones”, a determined existential positioning 
will be accepted as valid, for beyond the moralist and economic borders. 
(SCHMITT,1992, p.92)
Theories of Democracy
In the present section of the paper we will embark in the short exposition 
of some exponent theorist of modern democracy, such as Kelsen, Habermas 
and Bobbio. It brings the intention to enrich the reflection put into practice, 
once right after that it will be exposed to the criticism made by Schimitt against 
such so-called liberal theories. Such itinerary does not aim the adhesion of the 
antithesis proposed by this author, or the thesis of another, but evidence the 
undertaken diaphonia, and based on that, try to evidence a possible substratum 
for a further active proposition. Adhering to a formalism, Noberto Borbbio 
defines as democratic regime the “group of regulations and procedures that aim the 
formation of collective decisions counting on the most part possible of the interested 
ones” (BOBBIO, 2000, p. 22).
Therefore, the democratic regime is represented by the procedural 
instruments that give legitimacy to a certain political decision. Furthermore, 
Bobbio states that for the actualization of the democratic regime, it is necessary 
the actualization of individual liberty, expression, opinion and association 
principles. Therefore, liberalism is a historical and juridical prerequisite for the 
State democratic regime. (BOBBIO, 2000, p. 32).
Another mark of the modern thinking about democracy, covered however 
by an empiric aspect, is the exposed by Robert Dahl and Arend Lipjhart, for 
whom the democratic regime is configured by the cumulative presence of 
certain elements, respectively: a) Effective participation in politics; b) Equal vote 
among adults; c) Acquisition of a clarified understanding about the institutions 
and political candidates; d) exercise control of state planning for accountability 
(DAHL, 2001) a) Sharing of the executive power through broad coalition 
cabinets; b) Equilibrium between executive and legislative power; c) multiparty 
system; d) proportional representation; e) corporatism of the interest groups; f ) a 
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decentralized and federal government; g) strong bicameralism; h) constitutional 
rigidity and judicial review; i) Independence of the central bank (LIPJHART, 
2003)
Moving on, we find in Kelsen a functional criteria for the justification of 
democracy, that is, we cannot cogitate about an absolute justification for it. It is, 
functionally, found in the understanding of the acting individuals. Thus, through 
Kelsean perspective, we negate the possibility of a substantial homogeneity, if it 
is presumed a debate made by parliamentary representativism. Therefore, Kelsen 
states that the modern democracy must be understood as being defined by a 
certain number of procedures through which the parliament and the parties play 
a central role, so that they are the necessary instruments for the creation of the 
state will. (KELSEN, apud MOUFFE, 1992, pp. 7, 8).
In a diverse sense, Habermas, influenced by his own discursive theory, 
declares that the core of democracy is the process of institutionalization of 
discourses and negotiation with the aide from the forms of communication. 
Therefore, through the discursive concept, we submit all action norm to 
the acceptance from those who participate in the rational discourses, in the 
same way that with them they are related. Thus, we assume an alternative to 
the principle of identity, according as the democratic State, and its inherent 
normative institutionalization, grants the effectuation of such principle among 
those who construct it and finds themselves related to it, being the respect to 
the individual rights the limiting factor to this multitude’s legislative process. 
Thus, we align the Habermasian theory with the liberalism for exceling the 
disassociation between “State” and “Civil Society”, once it aims to reduce the 
state influence over the individual freedom; notwithstanding, it also recognizes 
that it is in the State where the most elevate format of popular sovereignty 
is expressed. That said, Habermas, when exceling for the rational deliberative 
process as the foundation of legal regulations and the organization of public 
power, establishes the principle of representativeness, in a pragmatic order, as 
subsidiary and needed. (ARRUDA, 2011, pp. 105-130)
Chantal Mouffe exposes a relevant observation about the necessary distinction 
that we must make for the correct functioning of the Habermasian model, the 
one between the “interest agreement” and “rational agreement”. (MOUFFE, 1999, 
pp. 38, 53). This point is shown as very important to the critical approach of the 
way as the politics, by the means of its procedures, is practiced.
After briefly exposing some of the main modern democratic theories, the 
work will follow bringing the exposition of the Schmittian criticism against the 
implement of the metaphysical system perpetrated by the liberal ethos, which is 
the individualism. It is not against the liberalism in favor of the authoritarianism, 
but as the disclosure of its contradictions, in order to, this way, establish an 
adequation proposition aiming to strengthen the reflection about democracy.
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Liberalism and Politics
In his astute historical reading, Schmitt notices that the articulation between 
liberalism and democracy happens in the confrontation of the bourgeoisie 
against the monarchical power occurred in the 19th century. Such confrontation 
results in a necessary distinction between State and society, which transposes 
and concentrates this confrontation to a specific scope: the parliament. Such 
confrontation is not direct, that is, between general will and personalist will; but 
a confrontation through representatives of the people. Its product would be a 
rational and universal group or laws that would subordinate the power of the 
monarch.
In this transposition, which aims the limiting of the concentrated power 
to the monarch itself, resides a danger announced by Schmitt, which is the 
transmutation of the concept of law: it would be restricted only to what comes 
from the parliament. Thus, Schmitt questions about what the validity foundation 
is to reside in this matter the genesis legitimacy of the general will (supposedly) 
stated in a rational sense. He believes that such thought results in such a liberal 
metaphysical belief that the production of the truth and of justice would come 
through the discussion and free exchange of opinions. (ARRUDA, 2011, pp. 
105-130). In Schmittian words:
“The liberalism, based on its typical dilemma between spirit and economy, 
tried to reduce the enemy into a rival, under the economy perspective, 
and into an opponent of discussions, under the spirit perspective. In the 
economic field, in fact, there are no enemies, but only rivals, and in a totally 
moralized and ethical world maybe only opponents of discussions still 
remain.” (SCHMITT, 1992, p. 54)
This perspective of an eternal discussion reveals itself as harmful, once it 
dislocates issues of existential interests from a certain political unity, capable of 
establishing that “friend” and “enemy” conglomerate, to an individual range, and 
with this prevent the substantial change which would be product of the “sovereign 
decision” when it is necessary. For this the attention to the state of exception, again, 
becomes enlightening; once the “Rule of Law” is never capable of embracing such 
situation, and henceforth establish propositional measures to it.
Therefore, when we discuss about matters of second order, and set aside 
matters that bring polemic potential (political) for the individualism treatment, we 
would depoliticize the social environment, treating the parliamentary discussion as 
a mere “rational accordance” (using here the terminology coined in the prognosis 
made by Mouffe about the Habermasian theory), and, consequently, reinforce the 
antagonism in the social environment. At this point, it is important to make an 
analogy to the figure proposed by Thomas Hobbes in his leviathan about the state 
of nature (in the case of an environment where the individual ambit is where the 
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search for satisfaction happens), protecting, of course, the specific character of a 
snip, once in the Schmittian sense, the social contract would be an institutional 
breakdown, in view of his homogeneous conception of a public unity, which 
should exist since ever and not be built by the means of an accordance. So, in view 
of his conception, which appreciates the homogeneity inside a political unity, he 
refutes the pluralism; moreover, Schmitt opposes to the democracy proceduralist 
theorists. This is in view of his substantial search for a concept of equality inside 
the public unity. “In fact the worries of Schmitt lie upon the public unity; he believes 
the State cannot exist without it. For him, this unity consists in a common existence 
from which citizens participate, and that permits them to be treated as equals in a 
democracy.” (MOUFFE, 1992, pp. 8, 9) The disclosure of this substantial unity 
presented by Schmitt is what rises much distrust in relation to his thoughts 
leaning to the totalitarianism. 
Chantal Mouffe guides us through this confusion when exposing the 
proposition of Herman Heller when he revisits the Schmittian’s concept of 
political, about a “certain level of social homogeneity and shared political social values 
to the accomplishment of the democratic unity” (MOUFFE, 1992, p. 9); what does 
not exclude a certain social antagonism. This way, the theoretical foundation of 
a parliamentary democracy is found “not in the belief of a public discussion itself, 
but in the belief that there is a common base of discussion and the fair game for the 
opponent, whereby we wish to get to an accordance under the condition of ruling out 
the pure and simple brutal force.” (HELLER apud MOUFFE. 1992, p. 9). 
Thus, passing by the Schmittian criticism without adhering so, we find 
a synthesis: the individual liberties that represent the triumph of the liberal 
bourgeoisie should not be abdicated in favor of a totalitarian-personalist power. 
Likewise, the search for the formation of a certain homogeneity ( conferred by 
the principles of equality and liberty) where the general will should be formed, 
excluding the jus belli, by means of procedures and mechanisms that grant the 
possibility and concede effectiveness to it.
Conclusion
According to the exposed by Schmitt, as the liberalism aims to eradicate 
the conflict from the social, in view of its simultaneous aggregations to the 
State, and, thus, result in a depoliticization of the properly political ambit, 
we intend to revert the positioning with the exposed so far. Thereby, we do 
not intend to follow the Schmittian criticism, from which we used as support 
so far, in a fideistic way, but before our intention is to conciliate it with the 
most democratic possible aspect, which is currently denominated as “ultra-
democracy”. Therefore, we aim for an elaboration that does not target the 
destruction of the political ente, at the existential sense, or its depoliticization 
in the individualist practice:
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(…) one of the main tasks of the democratic politics is to neutralize the 
potential antagonism that exists in the social relations. If we accept that it 
cannot be done transcending the us/them relation, but only elaborating 
it a different way, we come across the following questioning: what would 
constitute a relation of tamed antagonism (…) (MOUFFE, 2015, p.18)
Henceforth, the agonic posture arises, where pluralism is recognized and there 
is no aim for its eradication from the political, where its negation would reside in 
case of occurring. Thereby, the pair friend-enemy gains features of us-them, that is, 
the capacity exists for a political instituted agglomeration for the (re)configuration 
of the object of the political decision, once every religious, moral, economic or any 
other antagonism becomes a political one provided it is strong enough to cause the 
effective regrouping of men into friends and into enemies.” (SCHMITT, 1992, p. 
77). This without the determination of “them” as being the enemy to be destroyed. 
thus, we conciliate the issue raised by Hanna Arendt about the driving pluralism of 
the social world, highlighting the topic where we elucidated the gnoseological human 
capacity, with the fideism: once there is no rational parameter of definition such as 
right-wrong, useful-harmful, beauty-ugly in the political ambit and on their decisions, 
this kind of specifical reflection must be elucidated as one from the several possibilities 
of represention of the world that, diaphonicaly, not only can but should be confronted, 
creating an agglomerate capable of defending its execution. The contribution of the 
proceduralism theorists reveals itself here as important once they formulate ways in 
the walking of the agonistic elaboration.
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